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“Did you ever expect a corporation to have a conscience, when it has
no soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked?”
— Baron Thurlow, Lord Chancellor of England1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Large public corporations have made tremendous contributions to our
society. We benefit from their continuing innovations in the products and
services that touch our lives many times each day. And they furnish gainful
employment to large numbers of people.2 When run honestly and in a
manner sensitive to the concerns of their customers and the public at large,
they have been a huge asset to our common life.3
Over the long term, these companies have advanced the standard of
living for a huge number of Americans and others around the globe.4 Yet as
American firms have continued to be profitable during the last thirty years,
the lion’s share of their income has gone to the wealthier strata of our
society.5 As Democratic presidential candidate Michael Bloomberg, a multi1. John Coffee, No Soul to be Damned, No Body to Kicked, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 386
(1981) (quoting the Lord Chancellor of England).
2. In 2018, Walmart, the largest company in the world by revenue had 2.3 million global
employees.
Michael Klazema, Top 10 Largest Employers in the USA,
BACKGROUNDCHECKS.COM, Nov. 21, 2018, https://www.backgroundchecks.com/community/
Post/5836/Top-10-Largest-Employers-in-the-USA [https://perma.cc/96F6-N4GC]. As of
2013, 1.3 million Walmart employees worked in the U.S. And each of America’s 10 largest
employers has more than 300,000 workers. Some big retailers and fast-food chains like Target
and McDonald’s, however, hire a large number of workers with low skills, pay them little and
offer them limited career opportunities. Several of those companies have reputations for being
unfriendly to unions. Other firms, however, like IBM and Hewlett-Packard that offer a wide
range of sophisticated products have high-skilled workers who are decently compensated. See
Alexander E.M. Hess, The 10 Largest Employers in America, USA TODAY (Aug. 22, 2013)
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/08/22/ten-largest-employers/268024
9/ [https://perma.cc/N7PT-VB7W] (discussing employment statistics and company data of
the ten largest companies in the United States).
3. Among the recent books written about the history of American business are ALAN
GREENSPAN & ADRIAN WOOLRIDGE, CAPITALISM IN AMERICA (2019); ROBERT J. GORDON,
THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH (2017); MICHAEL LIND, LAND OF PROMISE: AN
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (2013); and JOHN STEELE GORDON, AN EMPIRE OF
WEALTH (2005).
4. During the last 40 years, the income of the bottom half of the world’s populations has
doubled, and during the last three decades, the number of those living on less than $1.90 per
day—the World Bank’s threshold for extreme poverty—has dropped by more than half, from
nearly 2 billion to around 700 million. See Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Dublo, How
Poverty Ends: The Many Paths to Progress—and Why They Might Not Continue, Foreign
Aff., Jan.- Feb. 2020, 22 (examining poverty trends and data).
5. See EMMANUEL SAEZ & GABRIEL ZUCMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF INJUSTICE: HOW THE
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billionaire himself, put it: “The financial system isn’t working the way it
should for most Americans. The stock market is at an all-time high, but
almost all of the gains are going to a small number of people.”6
RICH DODGE TAXES AND HOW TO MAKE THEM PAY 3–11 (2019) (discussing the causes of
income inequality and the role of taxing the wealthy). The author has also written on this
topic, Daniel J. Morrissey, Executive Compensation and Income Inequality, 4 WM. & MARY
BUS. L. REV. 1 (2013) (discussing executive compensation and income inequality) and Daniel
J. Morrissey, Income Equality in Utopia, 48 U. OF PAC. L. REV. 79 (2016) (examining income
inequality).
At the beginning of 1990, 30 years ago, the Dow Jones Industrial Average was
2,753.20 and the NASDAQ was 454.82. See Rollicking, Rocketing Stock Markets, WALL ST.
J. Dec. 13, 1999 at C1, C23 (providing data on the Dow Jones and NASDAQ 1999 averages).
On February 14, 2020, the Dow closed at 29,398.08 and the NASDAQ at 9,731.18. In the
last three decades, the Dow increased more than 10 times and the NASDAQ double that. 80%
of that stock is owned by just 10% of Americans, and only 55% of our fellow citizens own
any at all. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
Most troubling, the standard of living once enjoyed by American workers continues
to decline. See Amanda Novello & Jeff Madrick, 11 Ways American Workers are Falling
Behind the Rest of the World, 62 CHALLENGE 21, 21–22 (2019) (discussing the myth that the
American standard of living is the gold standard); Esther Y. Peng, Is China Going to be the
World’s Largest Economy?-Comparing Standard of Living in China and the U.S. in the Next
Twenty Years, CULMINATING PROJECTS IN ECONOMICS, at 7–10 (May 2019) (examining
standards of living in the United States and China). But see Economists are Rethinking the
Numbers on Inequality, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 28, 2019 https://www.economist.com/briefing
/2019/11/28/economists-are-rethinking-the-numbers-on-inequality [https://perma.cc/ZMS6J5P6] (asserting, among other things, that the income share of America’s top 1% taking into
account taxes and transfers to those on the lower end of the economic scale has changed little
since 1960).
Meanwhile, the wealth of America’s superrich continues to climb. Jeff Bezos, the
founder of Amazon, is reputed to be worth a $114 billion. See Charles Duhiigg, The
Unstoppable Machine, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 21, 2019 at 42, 53 (providing an estimate of
Jeff Bezos’s net worth). A well-written recent piece focusing on Disney heir, Abagail Disney,
described her concern that the famous entertainment firm was not providing decent
compensation to most of the workers at its parks when the company’s CEO Bob Igor received
over $ 65 million in pay last year. See Sheelah Kolhatkar, The Ultra-Wealthy Who Argue that
they should be paying higher taxes, THE NEW YORKER (Dec. 30, 2019) (presenting
commentary on wealthy Americans who believe that their taxes should be raised).
For a fine new book on how these disturbing economic changes have hit ordinary
Americans, see NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF & CHERYL WUDUNN, TIGHTROPE: AMERICANS
REACHING FOR HOPE (2020). A heightened public awareness of this came from the Occupy
Wall Street movement in 2011 where people gathered in a park outside New York’s financial
center to protest the concentrations of wealth in our society. Its energy has gone into a number
of movements since then to correct inequities in our society. See Michael Levitin, The
Triumph of Occupy Wall Street, THE ATLANTIC (June 10, 2015) (discussing income inequality
in the United States).
6. See Andrew Ross Sorkin and Michael J. de la Merced, Michael Bloomberg Leans
Left with Plan to Rein in Wall Street, N. Y. TIMES (Feb.18, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/2
020/02/18/business/dealbook/michael-bloomberg-wall-street.html [https://perma.cc/WJ7N-S
CSZ] (quoting Michael Bloomberg).
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This economic discontent was also well capsulized by another
Democratic Presidential candidate, Pete Buttigieg: “Neo-liberalism is the
political-economic consensus that has governed the last 40 years of policy in
the U.S. and the U.K. Its failure helped to produce the Trump movement.
Now we have to replace it with something better.”7
These large corporations are the repositories of tremendous riches and
power.8 As such, their many fine contributions to society can be perverted
when they act corruptly or fail to share the wealth they create in a just
manner. Through the history of our country’s industrial development
therefore, our political system has attempted to curb some of those harmful
tendencies through the development of various principles of corporate law
and other regulatory initiatives.9
However, when these safeguards become ineffective, the result has
often been disastrous for many of the constituencies of these large firms and
for our nation at-large. From the robber baron era down to present times,
American business history can be seen as a series of scandalous and corrupt
practices that in their aftermath have shocked the conscience of society.10
This Article begins with a discussion of one massive fraud that recently
rocked public confidence: the corrupt sales and lending practices at Wells
7. Anand Giridharadas, How the Elites Lost Their Grip, TIME, Dec. 2, 2019.
“Neoliberalism or neo-liberalism is the 20th century resurgence of 19th-century ideas
associated with economic liberalism and free-market capitalism . . . [and] was part of a
paradigm shift that followed the failure of the Keynesian consensus in economics to address
the stagflation of the 1970s.” Neoliberalism, WIKIPEDIA, THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://en
.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neoliberalism [https://perma.cc/78Q6-LMWA].
8. The top 50 U.S. companies have a combined market capitalization of more than $12
trillion. The largest of these is JPMorgan Chase with $2.7 trillion in assets. See Sarah Hansen,
America’s Largest Public Companies in 2019, FORBES (May 15, 2019) https://www.forbes.
com/sites/sarahhansen/2019/05/15/americas-largest-public-companies-2019/?sh=52f94175
551e [https://perma.cc/5Y9A-3XBJ] (presenting market value and data of America’s largest
public companies in 2019). JPMorgan Chase’s CEO is Jamie Dimon, Chair of the Business
Roundtable. Giridharadas, supra note 7, at 46 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 56-6060 and accompanying text (discussing reform legislation from
the Securities Act of 1933 to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010).
10. See M. Thomas Arnold, “It’s Déjà vu All Over Again,” Using Bounty Hunters to
Leverage Gatekeepers, 45 U. TULSA L. REV. 419, 420–24 (2010) (providing a partial list of
scandals in American business history). And in the first decade of this century, came two
major corporate scandals, options-backdating and the sub-prime crisis, that caused the
financial meltdown of 2008. The author has written about those in Daniel J. Morrissey, The
Path of Corporate Law: Of Options Backdating, Derivative Suits, and the Business Judgment
Rule, 86 OR. L. REV. 973, 982–90 (2007) (discussing options-backdating, derivative suits, and
the Business Judgment Rule) and Daniel J. Morrissey, Shareholder Litigation after the
Meltdown, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 531, 539–41 (2012) (discussing economic conditions after the
2008 housing crisis).
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Fargo, our nation’s fourth largest bank.11 As a financial institution, it was
heavily regulated, but that did not prevent the bank’s systematic deceptions
that cheated thousands of its customers and undermined the integrity of its
core business. After laying out that wrongdoing, the Article will then
describe one remedial measure adopted by Wells Fargo that may show
promise to deter such frauds and hold corporations accountable to the
common good, a Stakeholder Advisory Council.12
The Article will then put that innovation in context by briefly reviewing
the various laws and regulations now in place that are supposed to prevent
such large-scale corrupt activity. The legislative response to such recent
frauds, like the accounting scandals of the 90s13 and the sub-prime mortgage
frauds of the last decade,14 has been to enact new laws such as the SarbanesOxley Act of 200315 and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010.16 They in turn only reinforced earlier reform
legislation such as the landmark federal securities laws of the 1930s.17 These
sought to redress the fraudulent practices that were a contributing cause to
the stock market crash of 1929 and the resulting Great Depression.18
These relatively new Acts might have tightened up corporate regulation
(and provided more work for lawyers and accountants) but as the crimes at
Wells Fargo show, the potential for enormous business corruption remains
with us. As one wry commentator put it, “[C]orporate Fraud is sort of like
grass, it grows, it gets cut down, and it grows again.”19 Stakeholders
Advisory Councils, however, like the one adopted by Wells Fargo, might
just stop such harmful practices, or at least make their growth more difficult.
Just as significant, however, is the potential of these Councils to
advance a significant trend in corporate law: the movement to expand the
11. Wikipedia, Wells Fargo, infra note 25 and accompanying text.
12. WELLS FARGO, infra note 42.
13. See JONATHAN R. MACEY, ET AL., THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 356–61
(13th ed. 2017) (discussing the 2001 Enron scandal).
14. Arnold, supra note 10 and accompanying text.
15. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 19,
28, and 29 U.S.C.).
16. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 933, 124 Stat. 1376, 1883–84 (2010).
17. The Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa) and its companion legislation, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat.881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm). See infra
notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing the variety of causes of the Great
Depression, including the misdirection of capital within the U.S.)
19. See Kurt Eichenwald, The Last Two Years: The Momentous Changes in Corporate
America, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 245, 246 (2003) (discussing and analyzing prominent cases of
corporate fraud).
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mission of those hugely important organizations to include not just profitmaking but also the larger needs of society and the environment.20 This piece
will discuss proposals from social commentators, legislators, and the
business community itself to address those concerns and talk about how they
might be furthered by these Advisory Councils.21
The Article will close by examining some open issues about these
panels. That will include a discussion about them with a leading member of
Wells Fargo’s advisory council where she gave her response to such
important questions as these. Are Advisory Councils mere window dressing,
or can they be effective in shaping corporate policy to make firms operate
more honestly and serve the broader needs of society?
In that regard, important opportunities exist where corporations with
their outsized resources can be a force for good and promote a more just
society. Among them are ways they can address extreme wealth and income
inequality,22 climate change, and environmental degradation.23 This Article
will close by exploring how Advisory Councils might be able to shape
corporate policy to address those pressing needs, and how they might even
be an important first step in shaping a new and more democratic form of
capitalism.24
II.

CORPORATIONS AND THEIR DISCONTENT

A. Shameful Practices at Wells Fargo
Not long ago, Wells Fargo may have enjoyed the best reputation of
America’s four largest banks.25 In 2016, however, it was rocked by
20. Murray, infra note 150 and accompanying text.
21. Ingley and Van der Walkt, infra note 151 and accompanying text.
22. Banerjee and Dublo, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
23. See Thomas Friedman, The Answers to Our Problems Aren’t as Simple as Left or
Right, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/23/opinion/republicandemocratic-parties.html [https://perma.cc/MF5P-KKES] (quoting remarks by Marina Gorbis,
executive director of the Institute for the Future, and discussing the dangers raised by giant
monopolies).
For more on the growth in activism that is challenging “unrestrained capitalism” and
“corporate greed that has endangered the planet” see Tim Wu, The Revolution comes to
Davos, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/23/opinion/sunday/da
vos-2020-capitalism-climate.html [https://perma.cc/6BYE-5RD9].
24. For a fine essay on that see Thomas Geoghegan, Educated Fools, Why Democratic
Leaders Still Misunderstand the Politics of Social Class, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 20, 2020
(discussing the politics of social class).
25. Wells Fargo, WIKIPEDIA, THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/We
lls_Fargo [https://perma.cc/LVB8-QM4H] (last visited Jan. 25, 2020).
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disclosures of a number of fraudulent practices that had gone on there for
over a decade. Under pressure from the bank’s top management, its
employees created more than 3.5 million fictitious checking and savings
accounts for its customers. They also engaged in other unauthorized
activities by applying for credit and debit cards for Wells Fargo’s clients
without their knowledge and fabricating phony email addresses to enroll
them in online-banking services.26
These frauds were the result of aggressive practices by Wells Fargo
employees to “cross-sell,” i.e., to enroll their customers in as many services
as possible that the bank offered. All of that came about because of intense
pressure put on branch managers and individual Wells Fargo employees to
meet unrealistic quotas.27 At first, the bank’s upper echelon denied any
connection to those perverse sales practices and fired over 5,000 of their
workers who had set up fake accounts. Subsequent investigations, however,
revealed that Wells Fargo’s CEO John Stumpf and his protégé, Carrie
Tolstedt, the head of retail banking, were the ones responsible for all this
outrageous wrongdoing.28
26. For a detailed chronology of all this wrongdoing, see Ethan Wolff-Mann, Wells
Fargo Scandals: The Complete Timeline, YAHOO FIN. (Mar. 12, 2019), https://finance.yahoo.
com/news/wells-fargo-scandals-the-complete-timeline-141213414.html [https://perma.cc/7J
4W-N9XW]. See also Mark Levine, Fake Accounts Still Haunt Well Fargo, BLOOMBERG FIN.
(Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-10-23/fake-accounts-stil
l-haunt-wells-fargo [https://perma.cc/A7M9-HRFZ] (describing the scandals in additional
detail). Another good piece telling this scandalous story is Mark Levine, Fake Accounts Still
Haunt Well Fargo, BLOOMBERG FIN. (Oct. 23, 2018).
27. Despite disclosure of this egregious behavior and purported reforms made to correct
it, bank workers say that wrongful treatment of employees and customers remains a problem.
Michael Sainato, Wells Fargo Employees Say Little Has Changed Since Fake Accounts
Scandal, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/jan/04/
wells-fargo-fake-accounts-scandal-employees [https://perma.cc/67B6-UGRL].
Another
report said Wells Fargo has “a largely demoralized work force that is chafing under the bank’s
leadership.” Emily Flitter & Stacy Cowley, Worst Job in Banking Opens Up. Who’ll Bite?,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2019), at B1. And the bank’s principal regulator, the Office of the
Controller of the Currency (OCC), has recently said that the bank continues to have a massive
backlog of employee complaints. Rachel Louise Ensign, Wells Fargo’s List of Woes Grows,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 5, 2019), at A1.
Even though the bank’s profits rose recently, it has been struggling. As one report
described the situation, “What was once an aggressive, rapidly growing lender whose profits
towered above those of rivals has become a firm with sluggish revenues that is leaning heavily
on cost cuts.” Rachel Louise Ensign, Wells Fargo Posts Higher Profit, WALL ST. J. (July 16,
2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wells-fargo-posts-higher-profit-11563279572 [https://p
erma.cc/B5LL-88QM].
28. In a settlement with the OCC, Stumpf agreed to a lifetime ban from banking and was
hit with a $17.5 million fine. In its findings, the OCC stated that Stumpf “was or should have
been aware of the problem and its root cause” and “there was a culture in the Community
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Under pressure from regulators, the bank also disclosed that it had been
cheating 800,000 of its automobile loan customers by improperly charging
them for collision damage insurance that they didn’t need. These
unwarranted extra costs pushed 275,000 of its borrowers into delinquency
and brought about over 25,000 wrongful repossessions of their cars.
On top of that, a whistle blower lawsuit also forced Wells Fargo to
admit that it had swindled thousands of its home loan borrowers by
improperly charging them fees to lock in extensions of their interest rates
because the processing of their applications was delayed. To justify that,
Wells Fargo managers sometimes got their employees to lie to their
customers, telling them they were to blame because they did not get all their
paperwork in on time.29
B. Sanctions and Judgments Against the Bank
Wells Fargo ultimately met a day of reckoning for all this reprehensible
conduct, suffering potential losses of about $3.1 billion.30 Regulators like
the Consumer Finance Protection Agency, the Comptroller of the Currency,
the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Federal Reserve also came
down hard on the bank with fines of $1.7 billion31 and other sanctions. As
of summer, 2019, Fed Chairman Jay Powell said the Central bank would not
lift a cap on the bank’s assets “until Wells Fargo gets their arms around this,
comes forward with plans, implements those plans, and we’re satisfied with
what they’ve done. And that’s not where we are right now.”32
After a hostile grilling before a Congressional committee, CEO Stumpf
resigned. So did his successor, Timothy Sloan, a Wells Fargo insider, when
he too met a tough reception before law makers lead by democratic
Bank that resulted in systemic violations and regulations.” Rachel Louise Ensign & Ben
Eisen, Wells Fargo Ex-CEO is Banned for Life, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2020), at A2. The OCC
is currently also seeking a $25 million fine from Tolstedt and a lifetime ban. Id. That matter
may have to be settled in an administrative proceeding. Id.
29. The details of these shameful sales practices are described in a shareholder complaint.
Wells Fargo Shareholder Derivative Complaint (May 30, 2018), Lead Case No. CGC-17561118 (Sup. Ct. of CA) [Wells Fargo Derivative Suit]. The author served as a consultant to
the lawyers bringing the case on behalf of Wells Fargo shareholders.
30. Patrick Thomas, Wells Fargo Raises Estimate of Possible Losses from Legal Action,
WALL ST. J. (May 3, 2019, 4:42 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wells-fargo-raises-possib
le-losses-from-legal-action-11556916174 [https://perma.cc/DPE4-6L2V].
31. Sainato, supra note 27.
32. Rachel Louise Ensign & Andrew Ackerman, Scandals Tarnished Wells Fargo.
Washington Claimed Its CEO, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 30, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/scandals-tarnished-wells-fargo-washington-claimed-its-ceo-11553950800 [https://p
erma.cc/WCH7-MSAR].
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presidential candidate Elizabeth Warren in the Senate and Congressman
Brad Sherman in the House.33 After that, it took some time for Wells Fargo
to find a new CEO. Running the nation’s fourth largest bank wasn’t such an
appealing job, noted the Wall Street Journal.34
That individual would “have to juggle fixing the bank’s problems with
Washington, reviving key businesses, and rehabilitating a corporate
reputation damaged by many problems[.]”35 Other commentators said any
new Wells Fargo CEO would have “to clean up [a] radioactive mess.”36
Things still had not improved in December 2019, when the Wall Street
Journal reported a large backlog of employee complaints at the bank.37
Charles Scharf, an outsider who had become the bank’s CEO in October
2019, finally achieved a settlement with the Justice Department and the SEC
in February, 2020 that resulted in Wells Fargo paying a $3 billion fine.38
But as regulators and lawmakers sought to hold Wells Fargo
accountable for harming so many of its clients, owners of the bank itself, its
shareholders were also taking action to make sure such reprehensible
conduct would not recur. The shareholders did that by initiating legal actions
against the bank’s management using the mechanism of derivative suits.
There the law allows shareholders who believe the management of their
companies have harmed them to champion causes of action on their
corporations’ behalf against their faithless officials.39 The relief from those
33. Id. As discussed above, Stumpf has now accepted a lifetime ban from banking and
is paying a $17.5 million fine. Although some banks have paid stiff penalties for wrongdoing
in recent years, the sanctions against Stumpf are noteworthy because few such fines have been
assessed against individual bankers. See Ensign & Eisen, supra note 28 and accompanying
text.
When Sloan, however, took over as Wells Fargo’s CEO in June, 2018, he began
receiving annual total compensation of $17.6 million, 564 times the average wage of the
bank’s employees which was $15 per hour. Sainato, supra note 27.
34. Ensign and Ackerman, supra note 32.
35. Rachel Louise Ensign & David Benott, CEO Candidates Spurn Wells Fargo, WALL
ST. J. (June 12, 2019), at A1.
36. Flitter & Cowley, supra note 27.
37. Ensign, Wells Fargo’s List of Woes Grows, supra note 27 and accompanying text.
38. Ben Eisen, Wells Fargo Settles U.S. Probes, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 22-23, 2020), at A1.
In announcing the settlement, Nick Hanna, U.S. Attorney for the Central District of California,
said: “This case illustrates a complete failure of leadership at multiple levels within the bank.
Wells Fargo traded its hard-earned reputation for short-term profits, and harmed untold
numbers of customers along the way.” Emily Flitter, To Settle Fraud Actions, Wells Fargo
to Pay $3 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 22, 2020), at B1.
39. The author has written extensively on the importance of this legal remedy to curtail
wrongdoing by corporate officers and directors. See generally Daniel J. Morrissey,
Shareholder Litigation after the Meltdown, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 531 (2012); Daniel J.
Morrissey, The Path of Corporate Law in the 21st Century, 86 OR. L. REV. 975 (2008).
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civil suits can be twofold. It can be in damages from the wrongdoing officers
and directors, which go to the injured companies. It can also come in
changes to the firms’ governance structures to make sure that such harmful
conduct will not happen again.
In the settlement of these derivative suits brought to remedy Wells
Fargo’s reprehensible conduct, the plaintiff shareholders achieved both those
goals. They got Stumpf and Tolstedt to forfeit $60 million of equity
compensation, and they also got Wells Fargo to agree to a number of reforms
that should serve as an effective safeguard against such wrongful practices
in the future.40
C. Wells Fargo’s New Advisory Council
One of these reforms may be the most far-reaching of all—the creation
of an external Stakeholders Advisory Council. It represents groups who
focus on issues such as consumer rights, fair lending, and proper corporate
governance. The Council is also charged with providing direct feedback to
Wells Fargo’s board and senior executives on how the bank’s programs are
impacting underserved or vulnerable communities, many of which were
harmed by the bank’s fraudulent practices.41
When Wells Fargo announced the launch of this Council, it elaborated
on that mission, saying that it would “provide insight and feedback to the
Company’s Board of Directors and Senior Management from a stakeholders’
perspective.”42 In addition to championing the needs of underserved
communities, the Council would bring issues of “diversity, social inclusion
and environmental sustainability” to the attention of the bank’s leadership
groups.43 The Advisory Council was thus designed as a creative way to
improve board oversight by giving outsiders connected to the bank access
and input in its operations.
When constituted, the Council did appear to be a group suited to that
task. Included among its members were Sister Nora Nash, the director of
40. Wells Fargo Settlement and Release (Mar. 4, 2019), Lead Case No. CGC-17-561118
(Sup. Ct. of CA) (from Wells Fargo Derivative Suit, supra note 29).
41. Id.
For the author’s opinion on why on those reforms confer meaningful benefits on
Wells Fargo and its shareholders, see Declaration of Professor Daniel J. Morrissey in Support
of Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement filed in the Wells
Fargo Derivative Action (June 26, 2019), Lead Case No. CGC-17-561118 (Sup. Ct. of CA).
42. Wells Fargo Launches Stakeholder Advisory Council, WELLS FARGO (Dec. 21, 2017),
https://stories.wf.com/wells-fargo-launches-stakeholder-advisory-council/ [https://perma.cc/
GF27-NTUV] (last visited Nov. 16, 2020).
43. Id.
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Corporate Social Responsibility for the Sisters of St. Francis of
Philadelphia44 and representatives from such groups as The National Urban
League, The Centre for Responsible Lending, and the Director of Corporate
Governance of the California State Teacher’s Retirement System.45
In establishing the Council, Wells Fargo professed its commitment to
the broad goals that it would be advocating, stating, “It is important that the
top leadership of our company hears directly from our stakeholders, and we
look forward to benefiting from the Council’s diverse perspectives and
experiences, particularly with respect to our commitment to our customers
and communities.”46 Perhaps the best advice the Council could give in that
regard was put succinctly by Shemeeka Beckham, an overcharged auto-loan
customer now suing Wells Fargo, who stated, “I would advise the new
C.E.O.—he or she—basically to just be more considerate of people.”47
D. The Impact of Advisory Councils on Traditional Corporate
Governance
Stakeholders’ Advisory Councils like Wells Fargo’s have the potential
to beneficially modify the traditional structure of corporate governance—to
put a conscience in a soulless institution. From their origins, corporations
have professed no such moral sensitivity.48 Rather pragmatic considerations
led to their dominance of our country’s economy.
In their modern form, corporations came to the forefront of American
business during the second half of the 19th century because they were the best
legal vehicle in which to organize a large company. Gigantic enterprises like
oil, steel, railroads, large-scale manufacturing, and food processing were
then becoming the driving force in our economy, and they needed large
amounts of capital.49
The corporation provided an ideal form to raise those funds from far-

44. Sister Nash, infra note 174 and accompanying text.
45. WELLS FARGO, supra note 42.
46. WELLS FARGO, supra note 42.
47. Flitter & Cowley, supra note 27, at B5.
48. COFFEE, supra note 1 and accompanying text. For an interesting twist on that, see
KENT GREENFIELD, CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE TOO (AND THEY SHOULD ACT LIKE IT) (2018).
The author takes off from the notorious Citizens United case, which held that the Constitution
gives free speech protections to corporations. See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). If these institutions are afforded such rights, Greenfield says,
they should also assume certain responsibilities of citizenship such as acting conscientiously.
49. For a discussion of the historic and economic rise of the corporation in modern
America, see generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977).
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flung individuals who could invest even small amounts of their savings in
them. It offered these stockholders the opportunity to share in the profits of
those “big businesses” by purchasing the basic entrepreneurial interests in
those firms: their common shares. In addition, such investments gave
stockholders the protection of limited liability. They would not be
responsible for the debts of their firms beyond the amounts they
contributed.50
In return, it was only logical that such numerous and widely diffused
owners would cede the power to run their enterprises to a centralized
management—a board of directors that they would elect. After that,
however, a company’s stockholders would be passive, confidently hoping to
receive dividends and see the value of their shares increase.51
States that chartered corporate entities were at first fearful of the
concentrations of wealth and power that might arise from their activity and
sought to limit the size and the scope of their undertakings.52 But as these
jurisdictions began competing with one another for the revenue that
incorporation would bring, those restrictions fell away.53
Correspondingly, the raison d’etre of these business organizations was
said to simply be to make money for their shareholders. The Michigan
Supreme Court famously affirmed that in a case where Henry Ford seemed
to be taking his auto manufacturing firm in another direction—diminishing
its returns, at least in the short-term, by raising his employees’ wages and
decreasing the price that the buyers of his cars would pay.54 The Court
sustained a shareholder challenge to those policies by stating, “A business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the

50. As two authors put it, “The corporation allowed for the pooling of vast sums of
capital, an essential requirement for industries with large fixed-cost components: track,
locomotives, railway cars, buildings, factories, furnaces, and machines.” STEPHEN B. PRESSER
& JAMIL S. ZAINLALDIN, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN HISTORY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 359 (6th ed. 2006).
51. See Lucien Arye Bebchuck, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 833, 844–45 (2005) (discussing this arrangement between shareholders and directors
in detail).
52. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933), 548–49 (Brandeis, J.
dissenting) (arguing that this “race to laxity” stemmed from states’ revenue motives).
53. Id. at 559–60.
54. Ford stated this as the larger purposes he was seeking to achieve:
My ambition . . . is to employ still more men; to spread the benefits of this
industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help them build up their lives
and their homes. To do this, we are putting the greatest share of our profits back
into the business.
Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668, 671. (Mich. 1919).
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stockholders.”55
E. Earlier Approaches to Curb Corporate Wrongdoing
As the country moved into the twentieth century, however, it became
apparent that the actions of these large enterprises often had a harmful impact
on the common good. President Theodore Roosevelt famously called those
who ran the worse of such companies, “The Malefactors of Great Wealth.”56
Progressive era reformers like him therefore advocated that those firms be
regulated in the public interest. Through forceful political leadership, they
were successful in enacting anti-trust and various health and safety
legislation to stifle monopolies and protect workers and consumers from
harm.57
A decade later, the stock market crash of 1929, and the Great
Depression which followed, provided New Dealers the impetus for perhaps
the most constructive financial legislation that the country would ever see.58
Those were the Securities Act of 193359 and its companion, the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.60 Those laws were designed to protect investors by
requiring that companies seeking investments disclose all material facts
about their operations and continually update them so long as they remained
publicly-held.61 To make sure the new federal securities laws would be
55. Id. at 684.
56. Michael E. McGerr, A FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1870–1920 (2003) (quoting Theodore Roosevelt at the dedication of
a memorial to the Pilgrims at Provincetown, Massachusetts, in August 1907).
57. For a fine book about the legislative initiatives from that era that originated in New
York, see generally Terry Golway, FRANK AND AL: FDR, AL SMITH AND THE UNLIKELY
ALLIANCE THAT CREATED THE MODERN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (2018).
58. A Congressional committee made this statement about that in 1933: “Whatever may
be the full catalogue of the forces that brought to pass the present depression, not least among
these has been this wanton misdirection of the capital resources of the Nation.” H.R. Rep.
No. 73-85, at 2–3 (1933).
59. 15 U.S.C. §§77a-77bbbb.
60. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aa-78nn. Those federal statutes were not the first legislative forays
into that field. A few decades earlier, some states had enacted so-called “blue sky laws” to
give residents of their jurisdictions’ similar protection, but they were largely ineffective
because they failed to cover the national market for securities that had developed in the 20th
century. See Joseph C. Long, Blue Sky Law (Securities Law Vol. 12) (chart listing all the
“blue sky laws” that were passed by each state).
61. See Joel Seligman, The Historic Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System,
9 J. CORP. L. 1, 2 (1983) (explaining the responses to the SEC’s newly enacted mandatory
corporate disclosure system).
For the author’s opinion that this regimen of required disclosure is not enough to
protect investors, and rather that public officials should pass on the quality of these offerings,
see Daniel J. Morrissey, The Road not Taken: Rethinking Securities Regulation and the Case
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properly administered and enforced, the 1934 Act created an independent
regulatory agency, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).62 To
this day, it has generally maintained a good reputation for promoting investor
confidence and keeping America’s securities markets honest.63
However, the regime of disclosure mandated by the federal acts had
ramifications beyond mere investor protection, bringing about an indirect
form of corporate regulation. Businesses required by law to tell the public
about all significant aspects of their operations might understandably be
reluctant to engage in various types of harmful or fraudulent conduct that
their shareholders or political leaders might seek to redress.64
About the time this landmark legislation was passed, an influential
study revealed that ownership of large public companies had become quite
diffuse.65 No longer did their founders control a large amount of their shares,
but rather it was rare that any of their stockholders owned as much as one
percent of their companies. With shareholder voting power to elect directors
so fragmented, management groups through solicitation of proxies could
maintain their power as self-perpetuating oligarchies.66
Yet as the country entered the second half of the 20th century, few
seemed to believe that these large concentrations of wealth and power were
acting in ways that were inimical to society. Advocates of laissez-faire
economics asserted that the competitive pressures of the market would
guarantee that their activities would produce the goods and services that
people wanted.67 In addition, a good share price was a sign that the company
for Federal Merit Review, 44 U. OF RICH. L. REV. 647, 648 (2010) (detailing disclosure
system’s failure to protect investors).
62. For an interesting description of the SEC’s early years by one of its first chairmen
who later became a Supreme Court Justice, see WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, GO EAST YOUNG MAN
239–281 (1974). The SEC’s current self-description of its mission and operations can be
found at The Work of the SEC, https://www.sec.gov/about/what-we-do [https://perma.cc/K3J
K-2EXX].
63. See David L. Ratner, The SEC at Sixty: A Reply to Professor Macey, 16 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1765, 1779 (1995) (evaluating SEC’s reputation). The Commission, however, was
sorely embarrassed by the Madoff matter when it did not catch a decades-long Ponzi scheme
that bilked investors out of billions of dollars. Press Release, SEC, Office of Investigations,
Investigation of the Failure of the SEC to Uncover Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi Scheme (Aug.
31, 2009) (on files with the SEC).
64. See M. STEINBERG, CORPORATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS: A CORPORATE AND SECURITIES
LAW PERSPECTIVE 29 (1983) (discussing the Commission’s influence on corporate internal
affairs).
65. ADOLF BERLE AND GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932).
66. Id. at 6.
67. The classic statement of this outlook is found in Milton Friedman, The Social
Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 13, 1970) § 6
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was using its resources well and serving the general economy.68 Any harmful
conduct that they might engage in could be corrected by actions of the
regulatory state.69 In the general prosperity during the decades following
World War II, few therefore questioned America’s corporate system.70
F. A New Era Brings Increased Concerns
As the country moved into 1960s and 70s, however, civil and women’s
rights and environmental concerns came to the forefront, and corporations
became suspect for acting in ways that frustrated those goals.71 A renewed
global economy and a sluggish stock market also contributed to a general
unrest about the legitimacy of American corporations.72
Classical economics had answers for some of those problems. If
corporations were not acting efficiently to maximize profits, market forces
would cause the price of their stock to drop.73 Managers of such
underperforming corporations could be disciplined by tender offers for their
shares that would result in their replacement by more efficient stewards of
the company’s assets.74
(Magazine), at 32.
68. Id.
69. HENRY M. HART AND ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (1958).
70. For a lengthy discussion of this thirty-year phenomenon of economic well-being that
the West enjoyed up to the 1970s, see Thomas Piketty, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2014) (explaining corporate impact after World War
II).
71. See Blumberg, The Politicization of the Corporation, 51 B.U. L. REV. 425, 433 (1971)
(showing how communities began to hold corporations accountable for their social impact on
society). See Schwartz, Defining the Corporate Objective, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 511, 521–
22 (1984) (suggesting a corporation’s purpose is not only economic).
72. For a distinguished jurist’s remarks about how the argument over a corporation’s duty
to maximize profits and its obligations to act in a socially responsible manner had been
“papered over” when American companies were free from global competition and impervious
to hostile take-overs, see William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Concept of the Business
Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 262, 263 (1992) (explaining how global competition has
altered corporate responsibility). Then, corporate philanthropy was easily justified as being
in the long-term best interest of the firm and its shareholders.
73. The rise of the efficient market hypothesis supported that outlook. See Eugene Fama,
Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 413–16
(1970) (explaining corporate efficiency through the market). A market might undervalue a
company when its resources were managed inefficiently. See Henry Manne, Mergers and the
Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112–13 (1965) (showing that an active
market for corporate control exists).
74. A well-regarded federal judge called a hostile take-over, “the sharpest blade for the
improvement of corporate management.” See H. Friendly, Make Haste Slowly, in
COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE 525, 532 (D. Schwartz ed.
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Along those lines, some argued that the current system of corporate law
was sufficient to safeguard the interests of stockholders/owners and other
interested parties. Shareholders could rely on hostile take-overs or sue
directors for breaches of their fiduciary duties to make sure their investments
were protected.75 And under a theory which saw the corporation as a “nexus
of contracts,” its other constituents like employees and creditors could
regulate their relationships to it by legally enforceable agreements and sue
for breach if promised performances were not forthcoming.76
Other commentators, however, saw that the problem of management’s
accountability to its shareholders was a stickier one because of agency costs
in the system. Corporate officials, particularly CEOs who were supposed to
be working for their shareholders, had self-interested conflicts that were
easily abetted by pliant directors. Instead of maximizing profits for their
stockholders, corporate officials could shirk that responsibility or find ways
to channel corporate wealth to themselves and their friends.77
This problem was compounded, said those critics, by the inability of
widely-scattered shareholders to monitor such misfeasance.78 On top of that,
the business judgment rule prevented them from challenging corporate
policy, so long as the firm’s officers and directors were not personally
enriched by it.79 True, management underperformance could depress a
stock’s price, inviting a hostile take-over, but that was often a very blunt
instrument for making officers and directors more accountable to their
shareholders. In fact, case law from the dominant corporate jurisdiction,
Delaware, allowed incumbent boards to adopt tactics like poison pills that
might ward them off.80
1979) (arguing takeovers serve as a tool for improving corporate management).
75. As the Delaware Supreme Court put it, corporate officers and directors owe a loyalty
and allegiance to the corporation—a loyalty that is undivided, influenced by no consideration
other than the welfare of the corporation. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811–15 (Del.
1984).
76. For a good discussion of the development of this theory see Anselm Schneider and
Andreas Georg Scherer, Corporate Governance in a Risk Society, 26 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 309,
310 (2015) (arguing contracts limit risk toward stakeholders). See also Jenson and Meckling,
infra note 87 and accompanying text.
77. Robert C. Bird and Stephen Kim Park, Organic Corporate Governance, 59 B. C. L.
REV. 21, 32–33 (2018) (showing how agency cost in the systems make management
accountability more difficult).
78. BERLE AND MEANS, supra note 65.
79. The Delaware Supreme Court described the business judgment rule with these
comments: “A board of directors enjoys a presumption of sound business judgment, and its
decisions will not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational business purpose.”
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d. 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
80. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc. 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. 1985) (ruling
incumbents can use poison pill as a defense to hostile takeovers).
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In the face of such management entrenchment, administrative and
legislative additions to the federal securities laws gave substantive rights to
shareholders facing tender offers and further empowered them by placing
new disclosure obligations on public companies.81 And laws passed in the
wake of the accounting frauds of the dot.com era and the sub-prime mortgage
crash, respectively the Sarbanes-Oxley82 and Dodd-Frank Acts,83 put more
disclosure duties on public companies.84
Along with that, a movement arose to strengthen internal corporate
governance by requiring that boards have more independent directors who
would not be beholden to their officers. They would thus be freer to monitor
management.85 This would include the unfettered ability to remove a poorly
performing CEO and to exercise meaningful oversight to prevent unlawful,

81. For a good discussion of the federal laws governing tender offers, see Thomas Lee
Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation, 393–444 (7th ed. 2017) (discussing legal process
governing tender offers).
82. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 (2002).
83. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203 (2010).
84. Bird and Park, supra note 77 at 26.
85. See, e.g., Jeffrey Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States.,
1950-2005, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1469 (2005) (explaining independent directors’ role in
monitoring management). It has long been the case that the wide-spread shareholding in
public companies gives stockholders little incentive to be active in the election of their
directors. Accordingly, those firms have become self-perpetuating oligarchies, where the top
management selects their directors through their control of the proxy solicitation mechanism.
See BERLE AND MEANS, supra note 65 and accompanying text.
Recently, however, there has been a strong push for more diversity on boards. As a
California state senator put it, “The corporate boardroom has been a white-male bastion for
far too long, limiting the opportunity for women and others to participate.” Jessica Guynn,
California Boardrooms are put on notice, USA TODAY, Jan. 3, 2020, at 2A. Accordingly,
California now requires that public companies headquartered in that state have at least one
female director. Id. And companies that are rated highly for their socially responsible activity
have higher percentages of female directors than other firms. Erynne E. Landry, Richard A.
Bernardi and Susan M. Bosco, Recognition for Sustained Corporate Social Responsibility:
Female Directors Make a Difference, 23 CORP. SOC. RESP. ENVIRON. MGMT. 27, 31–36
(2016).
Adding to this movement is the recent statement by the leading investment banker at
Goldman Sachs that it will not underwrite public stock offerings for companies that do not
have diverse boards. Jeff Green, Goldman to Refuse IPOs if All Directors are White Straight
Men, (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.fa-mag.com/news/goldman-to-refuse-ipos-if-all-directorsare-white--straight-men-53760.html [https://perma.cc/C3RE-CRLJ]. The author has recently
written about the need for corporations to furnish more opportunity for African Americans.
Daniel J. Morrissey, George Floyd Protests Show Corporations Must Support Racial and
Economic Equality, THE HILL (June 4, 2020) https://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/501259protests-show-corporations-must-support-racial-and-economic-equality [https://perma.cc/PQ
5U-EUYY].
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or otherwise harmful, corporate activity. Stock exchanges included such
provisions for director independence in their listing requirements and
developed qualifications for that status.86
In line with increasing concern for the broader social responsibilities of
business, two leading corporate scholars advocated a different way to define
the duties of directors. Taking a more communal approach than the
individualistic “nexus of contract” theory,87 they asserted that a corporation
is a “team” organized to engage in productive activity.88 With that outlook,
directors should no longer be seen as a group obliged to just maximize profits
for shareholders, but as a “mediating hierarchy”89 for the interests of all those
touched by the activity of a corporation.
As such, a board would have duties to a myriad of individuals and
groups connected to a corporation, not just stockholders, but also employees,
creditors, consumers, and the communities where it did business. Each of
those groups are essential to the success of the enterprise and the directors
must be attentive to the needs and concerns of all of them.90
III.
A.

ENVIRONMENTAL, SUSTAINABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The Rise of Corporate Social Responsibility

This “team” approach was a close cousin to a newer way to view the
purpose of a corporation that arose during the last several decades, one that
would have it assume a larger role in promoting the common good. It has
become a real rival to the traditional shareholder primacy theory that
86. New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual, 303A.02, Independence Tests.
See also American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance §3A.01 (1994)
(recommending that boards of public companies have a majority of independent directors).
Along those lines, Sarbanes Oxley added a provision to the federal securities laws requiring
that directors of public companies who serve on audit committees be independent. 15 U.S.C.
§78j-1(m)(3) (as amended by Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002).
87. See Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310–11 (1976)
(arguing that the nexus of contracts helps regulate relationships among individuals in a
corporation).
88. Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 265–76 (1999).
89. Margaret M. Blair, Boards of Directors as Mediating Hierarchs, 38 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 297, 334–35 (2015).
90. In a famous address, Delaware Chancellor William T. Allen stated that the law was
not eager to grapple with the conflicting arguments between those who see corporations as
economic and financial entities as opposed to those who view them as institutions with
political and social significance. It was the duty of directors, he said, to strike that balance.
Allen, supra note 72, at 264–65.
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prevailed for most of the last century, where profit-making was a
corporation’s top priority.91
Internationally, the United Nations has been a strong supporter of this
broader mandate for business, placing it within its mission to advance human
rights. In 2011, the UN published Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect, and
Remedy” Framework,92 which has been very influential in shaping
discussion on the world scene. It justifies the beneficent values it advocates
as being grounded in recognition of: “[t]he role of business enterprises as
specialized organs of society performing specialized functions, required to
comply with all applicable laws and to respect human rights.”93
The development of those principles involved multiple discussions with
stakeholder groups with a practical goal to bring about “on-the-ground
change in people’s daily lives.”94 To accomplish that, the UN emphasized
that it is important to have accountability and a grievance procedure that
individuals and groups can use to redress abusive business behavior.95 As a
result of that consultative process, it promulgated a document called Ten
Principles of the UN Global Compact.96
Its preamble forthrightly stated: “Corporate sustainability starts with a
company’s value system and a principles-based approach to doing business.
This means operating in ways that, at a minimum, meet fundamental
responsibilities in the areas of human rights, labour, environment and anticorruption.”97 While the compact is not legally binding, it is “designed to
stimulate change and to promote corporate sustainability and encourage
innovative solutions and partnerships.”98
91. See Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668, 671. (Mich. 1919) (holding that corporations are
organized and carried on primarily for the benefit of the stockholders).
92. John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General), Rep. on Issue of
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/14/27 (Apr. 9, 2010), https://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/trans_corporations/doc
s/A-HRC-14-27.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7H9-7N4A].
93. Id. at 6.
94. Rep. of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to United Nations
General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights,
Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development,
Summary of Five Multi-Stakeholder Consultations, U.N. Doc. A/HCR/8/5/Add.1, at 5 (Apr.
23, 2008).
95. Id. at 5.
96. The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, United Nations Global Compact,
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles [https://perma.cc/H42M-Z
KSS] (last visited Nov. 12, 2020).
97. Id.
98. Frequently Asked Questions, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, https://www.ungl
obalcompact.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/4F69-74FM] (last visited Nov. 12, 2020).
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In the United States, this more expansive and high-minded mission for
business has had many names, but it has come most often to be called
“corporate social responsibility (CSR)” and “Environmental, Sustainable
Governance (ESG).”99 It asserts that corporations must go beyond mere
token philanthropy, which was justified as being in the corporation’s
“enlightened self-interest.”100 Instead, they should make being a force for
good one of their principal goals.
B. The Triple Bottom Line
CSR’s strongest proponents espouse a “triple bottom line”101 approach
to corporate activity—it should make profit, but also engage in socially
beneficial activity and work for a sustainable environment. All three of those
objectives should be parallel priorities. Business leaders like Bill Gates and
John Mackey, the president of Whole Foods, have been champions of this
outlook. As Gates said in a famous speech advocating “creative
capitalism”102
It is mainly corporations that have the skills to make technological
innovations work for the poor. To make the most of those skills,
we need a more creative capitalism: an attempt to stretch the reach
of market forces so that more companies can benefit from doing
work that makes more people better off.103
Mackey, advocating a similar position, buttressed it by pointing out that most
99. Most recently, the author has written about this in Daniel J. Morrissey, The Riddle of
Shareholder Rights and Corporate Social Responsibility, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 353, 353–54
(2015).
100. Allen, supra note 72 and accompanying text.
For a contemporary defense of this more traditional outlook by two leading corporate lawyers,
see BARRY M. KAPLAN & GREGORY L. WATTS, DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ LIABILITY:
CURRENT LAW, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, EMERGING ISSUES (Practicing Law Inst. 3rd ed.
2019).
101. The term was popularized in the early 1990s by a well-known environmentalist, John
Elkington. He argued for a sustainable form of capitalism where a company’s profit-making
would be both eco-friendly and committed to a fair distribution of its wealth. MICHAEL KERR
ET AL., CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 24 (2009).
102. Gates first introduced the idea at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland
in 2008. Bill Gates, Chairman, Microsoft Corp., A New Approach to Capitalism in the 21st
Century, Address at the World Economic Forum (Jan. 24, 2008) (available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ql-Mtlx31e8 [https://perma.cc/K8TZ-N5N7]). But for a
critical comment on how the Davos gathering now just features just empty rhetoric, see Wu,
supra note 23.
103. Barbara Kiviat & Bill Gates, Making Capitalism More Creative, TIME (July 31,
2008), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1828417,00.html [https://perma
.cc/WLT9-6RRR].
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business people are motivated not just to make profit, but also at least in part
to do good for others.104 One commentator called the remarks of Gates and
Mackey prime examples of “philanthrocapitalism . . . a more selfconsciously innovative and entrepreneurial effort to tackle the world’s most
urgent social problems.”105 Not surprisingly, religious leaders like Pope
Francis have supported such sentiments,106 but public opinion has shifted in
that direction too. Seventy-seven percent of consumers now say that it is
important for businesses to be socially responsible,107 and 50% of them take
that into consideration when they buy things.108
C. Difficulties with this Approach
Balancing such different corporate priorities may not be easy, however,
particularly when less than maximally profitable activity may put firms at a
competitive disadvantage. As renowned venture capitalist Peter Thiel has
observed, only firms that have some insulation from market forces may have
room to vary their practices in that regard. Most have to fight hard just to
survive.109
A fine new book corroborates that.110 It tells the stories of forwardthinking entrepreneurs who have tried to have their companies serve the
needs of their employees and communities while at the same time making
104. JOHN MACKEY & RAJ SISODIA, CONSCIOUS CAPITALISM: LIBERATING THE HEROIC
SPIRIT OF BUSINESS (2013).
105. Chrystia Freeland, Plutocrats vs. Populists, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2013), at SR1.
106. See VATICAN PRESS, APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION EVANGLII GAUDIUM OF THE HOLY
FATHER FRANCIS TO THE BISHOPS, CLERGY, CONSECRATED PERSONS AND THE LAY FAITHFUL
OF THE PROCLAMATION OF THE GOSPEL IN TODAY’S WORLD 45 (2013) (“Just as the
commandment ‘Thou shalt not kill’ sets a clear limit in order to safeguard the value of human
life, today we also have to say ‘thou shalt not’ to an economy of exclusion and inequality.”).
The Pope will soon be hosting a conference of young economists in Assisi, Italy that will
promote “a different kind of economy: one that brings life not death, one that is inclusive and
not exclusive.” Marcelo J. Garcia, Can the Pope Deliver a Debt Miracle for Argentina?, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/30/opinion/pope-francis-argentina
.html [https://perma.cc/Q5W9-LJJL].
107. Knowlege@Wharton, Why Companies Can No Longer Afford to Ignore Their Social
Responsibilities, TIME (May 28, 2012), https://business.time.com/2012/05/28/why-companie
s-can-no-longer-afford-to-ignore-their-social-responsibilities/ [https://perma.cc/FXB6-VE6
A].
108. Craig Kielburger & Marc Kielburger, The Rise of Corporate Social Responsibility,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-rise-of-corporate-so
c_b_85395 [https://perma.cc/SU22-LTHP].
109. PETER THIEL, ZERO TO ONE: NOTES ON STARTUPS OR HOW TO BUILD THE FUTURE 44–
82 (2014).
110. JAMES O’TOOLE, THE ENLIGHTENED CAPITALISTS 2–26 (2019).
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competitive earnings. Starting with the nineteenth century Scottish reformer
Robert Owen, down to the present day, conscientious business leaders have
attempted to do well by doing good, but many have found that hard to do.111
Responsibility for adopting such broader policies, like all corporate
decision making, rests ultimately with a firm’s board, and the law gives it
some latitude there. Most significantly, the business judgment rule makes it
difficult to challenge actions determined by directors to be best for their
companies, particularly if they can be justified as promoting their firms’
long-term interests.112
So-called constituency statutes enacted by states to protect the
independence of firms in their jurisdictions give further leeway to directors
in meeting that challenge. They provide that boards may take the interests
of stakeholders other than their shareholders into consideration when
resisting hostile take-overs.113 The American Law Institute in its Principles
of Corporate Governance furnishes similar support for such broader
corporate objectives by encouraging directors in their decision-making to
take environmental and social factors into account, even when they could
diminish their firms’ profitability.114
As encouragement for corporations to directly profess such broad goals,
some new legislation allows a company to state in its charter that it may
engage in activity geared to further the common good that may be less than
optimally remunerative.115 And some reformers point to other countries like
Germany, where companies have two boards, one supervisory where diverse

111. O’Toole discusses a number of other companies who have taken that broad approach,
some like Johnson & Johnson and Levy Strauss that are household names. Id. at 145–205.
112. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d. 717, 720 (Del. 1971). See also A.P. Smith
Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 586–90 (N.J. 1953) (discussing when the Court upheld a
company’s contribution to a university).
113. For a good discussion of these, see Anthony Bisconti, The Double Bottom Line: Can
Constituency Statutes Protect Socially Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land, 42
LOY. OF L.A. L. REV. 765, 767–69 (2009). See also Lawrence E. Mitchell, Theoretical and
Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579,
579–86 (1992) (discussing constituency statutes generally).
114. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 201 (1994).
The ALI has initiated a new project to restate the law of corporate governance. The Institute
first tackled the subject of corporate governance more than 25 years ago. Although it provided
valuable guidance in a new and unfamiliar area of law at the time, this area has evolved quite
a bit in the intervening decades.
115. At least twenty-six states have passed legislation authorizing these “B” corporations.
Jennifer Ball, The B Corporation: Economic Thought on ‘Doing Good’ and the Profit Motive,
1–2 (Washburn Univ. School of Bus., Working Paper No. 165, 2014).
For a piece pointing out that such an approach appeals to consumers see Richard Stammer, It
Pays to Become a B Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 6, 2016).
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interests like those of the firms’ workers are directly represented.116
Yet even with such guidelines and proposed innovations, a board still
has to determine how much socially responsible conduct its corporation
should undertake—particularly if it may result in the sacrifice of profit. As
Delaware Chancellor William T. Allen stated in a famous address, the
business judgment rule gives it the authority for that. And as he put it,
“[r]esolving the often conflicting claims of these various corporate
constituencies calls for judgment, indeed calls for wisdom, by the board of
directors of the corporation.”117
Along those lines, this author and many others have advocated that
corporations be run, in ways that go beyond mere profitability, to promote
the common good.118 That admirable result may best come about, as one
commentator stated, “through a broad framework of economic, social,
environmental and ethical values and shared objectives that involve constant
interaction between the company and its various stakeholders.”119
D. Senator Warren’s Accountable Capitalism
Such an approach gained a major political advocate when Senator and
presidential candidate Elizabeth Warren introduced a bill in Congress in
August 2018, called The Accountable Capitalism Act.120 With a twist on

116. See Justin Fox, Opinion, Why U.S. Corporate Boards Don’t Include Workers,
BLOOMBERG OPINION (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-0
8-27/why-u-s-corporate-boards-don-t-include-workers [https://perma.cc/9E8Y-XQ2F] (“In
Germany, it’s considered perfected normal that half the members of corporate boards are
representatives of the corporation’s employees. In the U.S., where Senator Elizabeth Warren
recently proposed 40-percent worker representation, it seems like a radical idea.”).
Also, on the other side of the Atlantic, former British Prime Minister Theresa May
promised in 2016 when she was campaigning that she would allow workers to be represented
on boards (although that never happened), and French President Emmanuel Macron is
considering changes that would permit greater worker participation on boards in his country.
Andrea Garnero, What We Do and Don’t Know About Worker Representations on Boards,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 6, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/09/what-we-do-and-dont-know-aboutworker-representation-on-boards [https://perma.cc/4F9N-YKW6].
117. Allen, supra note 72 and accompanying text.
118. Morrissey, supra note 99.
119. JAMES ROSELLE, THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE: BUILDING SHAREHOLDER VALUE, IN
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF THE 21ST CENTURY
130 (Ramon Mullerate, ed. 2d ed. 2011).
120. S. 3348, Accountable Capitalism Act, 115th Cong. (2018).
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Supreme Court cases like Citizens United121 and Hobby Lobby,122 which
gave corporations free speech and religious rights enjoyed by natural
persons, Senator Warren’s bill would place the moral obligations of humans
on them as well.123
As the Senator wrote introducing her proposal to readers of the Wall
Street Journal:
American corporations exist only because the American people
grant them charters. Those charters confer valuable privileges—
such as limited liability for their owners—that enable businesses
to turn a profit. What do Americans get in return? What are the
obligations of corporate citizenship in the U.S.? For much of U.S.
history, the answers were clear. Corporations sought to succeed
in the marketplace, but they also recognized their obligations to
employees, customers, and the community.124
To restore that socially minded approach, the essence of Warren’s bill
would require companies with gross receipts over $1 billion to enroll as
federal corporations. They would then have duties to not only make money
for their shareholders but also to serve the interests of stakeholders like their
workforce, their communities, their customers, and the local and global
environment. In addition, these corporations would be required to have their
workers elect 40% of their directors.125
This plan would most likely redirect some of the profit generated by
these firms to a broader segment of the public. Those returns have largely
gone to their shareholders as reflected in a booming stock market.126 Yet

121. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 10 (2010). See the comment of
Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney, “Corporations are people.” Philip Rucker,
Mitt Romney says ‘Corporations are People’, WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2011).
122. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (1994).
123. Matthew Yglesias, Elizabeth Warren has a plan to save capitalism, VOX (Dec. 8,
2019), http://www.vox.com/2018/8/15/17683022/elizabeth-warrent-accountable-capitalismcorporations [https://perma.cc/Q7PC-3F3Q].
124. Elizabeth Warren, Companies Shouldn’t Be Accountable Only to Shareholders,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-shouldnt-be-account
able-only-to-shareholders-1534287687 [https://perma.cc/SZ9L-V7RX].
125. See Fox, supra note 116 (discussing the role of workers on corporate boards in
Germany). For a fine book about how this model of corporate governance, which exists in
Germany, promotes a better life for its citizens in that country, see THOMAS GEOGHEGAN,
WERE YOU BORN ON THE WRONG CONTINENT: HOW THE EUROPEAN MODEL CAN HELP YOU
GET A LIFE? (2010).
126. See Rollicking, Rocketing Stock Markets, supra note 5 (stating that in the last 30
years, the Dow Jones industrial average has increased more than 10-fold and the NASDAQ
has jumped even more astoundingly by 20 times).
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80% of those shares are owned by just 10% of the American public.127 A
large amount of that gain has also found its way into the pockets of many
corporate executives whose compensation has reached stratospheric
levels.128 Warren’s proposal would force companies to share more of that
with their workers and promote the common good.129
Defenders of the current economic system, of course, were not pleased
with Senator Warren’s proposal. For example, two conservatives attacked it
as undercutting retirement security. Citing statistics showing that older
Americans have a large percentage of their wealth in stocks, they argued that
Warren’s plan was a threat to those savings: “among all the Democratic
taxers and takers” they wrote, “no one would hit retirees harder than Sen
Elizabeth Warren. Her ‘Accountable Capitalism Act’ would wipe out the
single greatest legal protection retirees currently enjoy — the requirement
that corporate executives and fund managers act as fiduciaries on investors’
behalf.”130
E. The Business Roundtable Pushes the CSR Movement Forward
The drive to promote socially responsible conduct by corporations also
got a big boost in the summer of 2019 from a startling statement by the
leaders of our country’s 200 largest firms. In what the Wall Street Journal
called “a major philosophical shift,”131 the Business Roundtable broke from
the traditional shareholder primacy approach it had long advocated, which
held that a corporation’s principal duty is to make a profit for its
shareholders.132
Rather, the leaders of those firms now said that their decisions should
take into account more than just the interests of their investors and be
127. Rollicking, Rocketing Stock Markets, supra note 5.
128. Morrissey, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
See also Kolhatkar supra note 5 (disclosing the $65 million annual compensation of Disney
CEO Bob Igor).
129. Yglesias, supra note 123.
130. Phil Gramm and Mike Solon, Warren’s Assault on Retiree Wealth, WALL ST. J. (Sept.
10, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/warrens-assault-on-retiree-wealth-11568155283 [ht
tps://perma.cc/7ECZ-SHYY]. See also Lydia Saad, What Percentage of Americans Own
Stock, GALLUP (Sept. 13, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/266807/percentage-americansowns-stock.aspx [https://perma.cc/B54X-75UT] (announcing results of a poll showing only
55% of Americans own any stock, however, down from 62% a decade ago). And 80% of that
is owned by the wealthiest 10%. Rollicking, Rocketing Stock Markets, supra note 5 and
accompanying text.
131. David Benoit, Top CEOs See a Duty Beyond Shareholders, WALL STREET J. (Aug.
20, 2019), at A1.
132. Id.
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broadened to include those of “all stakeholders.” That larger mandate would
charge executives to be attentive to the concerns of their employees and
customers. In addition, it would impose a duty on them to protect the
environment and deal fairly and ethically with their suppliers. In their
pronouncement, the leaders made this high-minded pledge to all those
constituents of their firms: “We commit to deliver value to all of them, for
the future success of our companies, our communities and our country.”133
A good comment on that came from Indra Nooyi, a longtime leader at
PepsiCo, Inc. She noted that CEOs were now willing to step into a leadership
vacuum, and that they have a “bully pulpit” at a time when political leaders
have lost credibility because they are seen as “overly partisan and willing to
take divisive stands.”134 “Top executives” now can fill that void “to help
unite people behind social issues.”135
The Roundtable’s statement was also said to reflect “a moment of
increasing distress in corporate America, as big companies face mounting
global discontent over income inequality, harmful products and poor
working conditions.”136 Another commentator stated that the call for
corporations to become “more stakeholder-inclusive and socially responsive
is timely and significant.”137
Yet the same commentator cited the statement’s lack of specifics on
how corporate goals would be prioritized saying, “[C]orporate boards, senior
executives, investors, and government regulators can only speculate about
the statement’s true significance.”138 A progressive writer showed much the
same skepticism when confronting Jamie Dimon, the Roundtable’s
chairman, about his group’s failure to put many teeth into their promises. In
response, Dimon told her that the roundtable wasn’t a “police force” and
allegedly made a dismissive comment that “a lot of people don’t like to
work.”139
Another observer also downplayed the impact of the Roundtable’s
statement, calling it merely a truism. He pointed to a more conventional part
of the declaration asserting that a free-market economy is the best means for
assuring a prosperous society with a “healthy environment and economic
133. David Gelles and David Yaffe-Bellany, Shareholder Value is No Longer Everything,
Top C.E.O.s Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2020).
134. John D. Stoll, For CEOs, It’s a Whole New Job, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 18, 2019).
135. Id. For an earlier book advocating such a role for business leaders by a renowned
corporate executive, see Lee Iacocca, Where Have All the Leaders Gone? (2007).
136. Gelles and Yaffe-Bellany, supra note 133.
137. Alfred Rappaport, How CEOs Can Forge a New Kind of Shareholder Value,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Sept. 4, 2019).
138. Id.
139. Giridharadas, supra note 7, at 46.
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opportunity for all.”140 For that to be correct, he said, “No business can long
survive without meeting such stakeholders’ needs.”141
Yet those remarks were facile. Another more realistic commentator
saw the statement as reflecting pressure that business leaders were feeling
for the harms their firms have caused such as “climate change, growing
inequality (and awareness that these CEOs make hundreds of times more
than their employees).”142 Citing environmental challenges in particular, he
went on to assert, “[t]he current shareholder obsessed system is not fit . . . to
tackle shared global challenges.”143
A recent survey of Chief Financial Officers of large corporations
corroborates that, making the point that maximizing short term returns is still
the driving force in our capitalist economy. It revealed that “U.S. executives
feel five times the investor pressure of counterparts in Europe to deliver
quarterly performance, and double the pressure felt by many CFOs in
Asia.”144
Others were even more even dubious that the Roundtable’s
pronouncement would herald any real change in corporate behavior. Kev
Bertsch, the head of the Council of Institutional Investors, said the statement
just gives corporate leaders more room to dodge their duties to shareholders,
and there is no mechanism of accountability to anyone else.145 His group
also criticized the statement because “it is government, not companies that
should shoulder the responsibility of defining and addressing societal

140. James R. Copland, The Business Roundtable’s Statement Isn’t Revolutionary. It’s a
Truism, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2019).
141. Id. Another commentator made much the same point, saying, “How can shareholder
wealth ever be created except by satisfying stakeholders, who include customers, workers,
suppliers and the communities that create the legal environment in which firms operate?”
Holman W. Jenkins, Jr. CEOs for President Warren, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2019), https://ww
w.wsj.com/articles/ceos-for-president-warren-11566341440 [https://perma.cc/ND9R-E3M
Y].
142. Andrew Winston, Is the Business Roundtable Statement Just Empty Rhetoric?,
HARVARD BUS. REV.: ECON. AND SOC’Y (Aug. 30, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/08/is-thebusiness-roundtable-statement-just-empty-rhetoric [https://perma.cc/NJH2-Y27J].
143. Id.
144. Eric Rosenbaum, Steve Mnuchin dissed 181 major CEOs in a new battle over the
future of profits, CNBC, (Sep. 20, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/20/steve-mnuchindisses-181-ceos-in-new-battle-over-future-of-profits.html [https://perma.cc/A473-ZVSU].
As another business leader, the founder and president of the CFO Leadership Council made
much the same point, saying, “How do you make decisions that are in the long-term best
interests of the company when most of the pressure comes from the current quarter?” Id.
145. Marc Benioff, We Need a New Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www
.nytimes.com/2019/10/14/opinion/benioff-salesforce-capitalism.html [https://perma.cc/GP46
-8CHJ].

2021]

THE PROMISE OF STAKEHOLDER ADVISORY COUNCILS

497

objectives.”146
Conservative leaders and commentators were also quite forceful with
their attacks the Roundtable’s Statement. When asked if companies should
serve all stakeholders, Vice President Mike Pence cautioned against “leftist
policies,”147 and Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin declined to
endorse the Statement.148 Wall Street Journal columnist Holman W. Jenkins,
Jr. called it “nonsense.” It was “throw[ing] shareholders under the bus,” he
said, and “a mighty fig leaf our corporate leaders have afforded themselves
if they must powwow with President Warren 17 months from now.149
IV.

STAKEHOLDER ADVISORY COUNCILS

A. The Benefits of these Panels
Despite those criticisms, the Roundtable’s Statement does afford
corporate leaders discretion to make the larger concerns of their stakeholders
part of their mandate. Yet the blunt fact remains that those non-shareholder
constituents of corporations have no actual power in the governance of their
firms and may not even be able to get their voices heard in corporate
boardrooms.150 Not only do they lack the influence to get their companies to
adopt socially beneficial policies, but such agendas still cut across the
conventional grain of American business.
For at least two decades, commentators have been calling on boards to
develop “a broader mindset and new skills”151 to deal with the exigencies of
global business. Two of them noted that corporate constituents other than
shareholders and directors could provide that guidance asserting, “[t]hese
stakeholders demand higher standards of governance from boards and
require greater accountability and professionalism . . . .”152
The commentators gave another important objective that those groups

146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Rosenbaum, supra note 144.
149. Jenkins, supra note 141.
150. See J. Haskell Murray, Adopting Stakeholder Advisory Boards, 54 AM. BUS. L. J. 61,
80 (2017) (quoting Leo Strine, the former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court:
“[a]bsent an effective voice by socially responsible investors, boards of directors will
naturally gravitate toward focusing solely on the only interest group wielding real power:
stockholders acting singularly based on a profit motive.”).
151. C. B. Ingley and N.T. Van der Walt, The Strategic Board: the changing role of
directors in developing and maintaining corporate capability, 9 CORP. GOVERNANCE 174, 174
(2001).
152. Id.
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could help achieve. They could address the need for a functioning society to
have an equitable distribution of its riches. As one put it: “Traditionalists
see the need to build long-term shareholder value while the socially
conscious see the need to share wealth in order to prevent individuals from
strangling the ‘golden goose.’”153
Still old habits die hard. As a repentant lawyer at a top firm wrote
recently about his life-time representing big companies: “The corporate
entity is obligated to care only about itself and to define what is good as what
makes it more money . . . . [That is] pretty close to a textbook case of
antisocial personality disorder. And corporate persons are the most powerful
people in our world.”154
Stakeholder advisory councils have the potential to broaden that narrow
outlook and are an important first step to give representatives of the more
diverse groups in our society some real authority to impact corporate policy.
They are not a new phenomenon. Ten years ago, they had already achieved
some success, and in the words of one observer, were “reaching a critical
mass.”155 Pointing to a number of companies that had adopted them, he noted
how they were helping to identify problems, develop strategies, and provide
management with feedback on its performance. These panels, he said, were
independent, credible representatives of major stakeholders.
They were not rubber stamps for dominant CEOs and their pliable
boards, but rather their critical friends, providing valuable insight to
management for dealing with market uncertainties. The piece cited a number
of well-known companies that had established these stakeholder panels,
including BP, Shell, Burger King, Coca-Cola, Dow Chemical, Unilever and
Nestle. Properly constituted, the author said, these outside groups foster a
meaningful exchange with management, reflecting the concerns of their
members.156
Another report focusing on these panels in the U.K. said that they were
helping companies make better decisions on social and environmental issues
through open and honest dialogue with their top officials. It pointed out that
some of those firms had learned the hard way that ignoring stakeholder
153. Id. at 176.
154. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Ex-Corporate Lawyer’s Idea: Rein in ‘Sociopaths’ in the
Boardroom, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/29/business/dea
lbook/corporate-governance-reform-ethics.html [https://perma.cc/J7NE-NBZV] (quoting
Jamie Gamble, a corporate lawyer whose firm counted many of America’s largest
corporations among its clients).
155. Rajesh Chabara, Stakeholder panels – Reaching a Critical Mass, ETHICAL
CORPORATION (June 7, 2009), www.ethicalcorp.com/business-strategy/stakeholder-panels-re
aching-critical-mass [https://perma.cc/NH4E-EDK4].
156. Id.
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concerns about issues like child labor and environmental issues “can have
devastating effects on share price and corporate reputation.”157 It advocated
these joint management-stakeholder committees as vehicles to continue
addressing such issues. There, corporate leaders would engage with
individuals selected from among their firm’s various constituencies and
would make decisions in collaboration with them.158
The authors warned, however, that their proposal might not be a
panacea. It could be difficult for certain groups to develop a good
relationship with management due to a lack of trust or the complexities of
the issues. In such cases, disillusioned stakeholders might pull out of the
process if they saw it as a waste of time.159 To avoid that, they advocated
particular mechanisms for meaningful stakeholder involvement, such as their
participation in a firm’s environmental forum or its corporate social
responsibility committee.160
Along those lines, another study found that a company’s ecological
issues were particularly well-suited for such collaboration.161 As an example
of stakeholder involvement in product development, it described
Greenpeace’s role as a “strategic bridge” to an appliance manufacturer,
helping it make a more environmentally friendly refrigerator.162 It also
discussed other examples of employee participation with management that
can result in innovative solutions to problems by bringing diverse viewpoints
to reconsider them or by “combining competencies in new ways.”163
To that end, the study reported how some firms had benefited by having
stakeholder panels or advisory boards do period evaluation of their progress
on sustainability goals. Along the same line, it found similar good results
where management held direct and open communications at regular
interactions with stakeholders.164
Such meetings opened up the possibility for differing viewpoints to be
explored that often involved “triple bottom line” objectives. Sustainable
innovations could come about from those exchanges. Calling for more
research on this process, those commentators cited the potential for more
157. Heiko Spitzeck, David Grayson and Erik G. Hansen, Joint management-stakeholder
Committees, 11 CORP. GOVERNANCE INT’L J. OF BUS. IN SOC’Y 560, 562 (Oct. 2011).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 561.
160. Id. at 565.
161. Rosina Watson, Hugh N. Wilson, Palie Smart, and Emma K. Macdonald, Harnessing
Difference: A Capability-Raised Framework for Stakeholder Engagement in Sustainability
Innovations, 35 J. OF PROD. INNOVATION MGMT. 254, 271–74 (2017).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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“value-framing” and “systematized learning” that might take place if these
sessions involving management and stakeholders were better understood.165
B. The Place of Stakeholder Councils in Corporate Governance
With all their promise, a fundamental question remains. What power
will these panels have in corporate decision-making? Will they be merely
window dressing, with their members amenable to management influence
and advocating only token reform proposals? Or will they be constituted
with true representatives of company stakeholders and have a meaningful
say to advance beneficial social policy?
To that end, how will the members of these panels be chosen? Will
they be individuals who are likely to advocate forcefully for the broader
goals of the stakeholders? If they are appointed by management, will they
be indebted to those corporate leaders and therefore compromised in
discharging their far-reaching responsibility? Even if their selection is set
up to guarantee their independence, they could be captured by persuasive
executives unless they remain committed to their mission.
These panels should not only review proposals by management, but also
feel free to criticize all the activities of their corporations. They must be
given complete information about any matters involving their duties and
have resources and staffs to investigate any of those issues. Their existence
and mandate should be well publicized, and all interested individuals and
groups should be told they may freely communicate with them about their
concerns.
Top officials of their companies should be required to meet regularly
with them and informed that they must take their comments seriously.
Corporate leaders should be encouraged to seek out suggestions from the
members of these panels and give them their full consideration. As a further
step to assure some accountability here, these panels should move to publish
their recommendations and compel management to respond to them in
documents that are available to the public, such as their filings with the
SEC.166
165. Id.
166. As one commentator said about how a company should make good on the Business
Roundtable’s recent statement about its commitment to its stakeholders, “As a next step the
government could formalize this commitment, perhaps with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, requiring public companies to publicly disclose their key stakeholders and show
how they are impacting those stakeholders.” Benioff, supra note 145.
An analogy to the federal sentencing guidelines may be instructive. While those are
an attempt to bring consistency and eliminate bias in those proceedings, they are not
mandatory. A provision in them states, however, that if judges go outside of them in a
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C. An SEC Proposal Threatens to Insulate Corporations from Social
Concerns
Such a commitment to openness is needed now more than ever in light
of a proposed rule change by the SEC that would reduce an avenue of
accountability that public companies have to their shareholders and members
of the public. As it now stands, Exchange Act Rule 14a-8167 allows
shareholders whose stock has a market value over $2,000 to submit proposals
for a vote at shareholder meetings, so long as they have held their stock for
at least one year. If adopted, those resolutions become corporate policy.168
These exercises in shareholder democracy though, are typically
opposed by management and never secure approval by a majority of the
shares voting. Yet many of them bring important corporate policies like
working conditions and environmental protection to public awareness.169
sentence, they must give their reasons for doing so. Similar explanations could be required
of corporations who believe they cannot follow the recommendations of their Advisory
Panels. Here is the specific language from the guidelines:
(e) REQUIREMENT OF SPECIFIC WRITTEN REASONS FOR
DEPARTURE.—If the court departs from the applicable guideline range, it shall
state, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), its specific reasons for departure in open
court at the time of sentencing and, with limited exception in the case of
statements received in camera, shall state those reasons with specificity in the
statement of reasons form.
167. Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, 17 CFR §240.14a-8. For a good general
discussion of how this process works, see Lewis A. Black, Jr. and A. Gilchrist Sparks, III,
SEC Rule 14a-8: Some Changes in the way the SEC Staff Interprets the Rule, 11 TOL L. REV.
957, 960–62 (1980).
168. One commentator gave this description of shareholder proposals: “After more than
four decades of experience and modification, the consensus understanding of the typical rule
14a-8 proposal is that it is advisory or precatory in nature, frequently is made during a national
campaign by shareholders holding only a few shares in each of several targeted companies
and is convincingly rejected at the annual meeting.” Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional
Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate Democracy, 28 GA. L. REV. 97, 101 (1988).
169. Although Rule 14a-8(i)-(7) allows management to exclude proposals relating to its
ordinary business operations, one commentator, reviewing case law, has noted that corporate
decisions involving “matters which have significant policy, economic or other implications
inherent in them” may not be excluded on those grounds. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Revitalizing
SEC Rule 14a-8’s Ordinary Business Exclusion: Preventing Shareholder Micromanagement
by Proposal, 85 FORD. L. REV. 705, 705 (2016). He is critical of that approach because, he
says, it is contrary to state corporate law principles. Id.
Others however have praised this process. “The shareholder proposal rules permit
investors to express their voices collectively on issues of concern to them, without the cost
and disruption of waging proxy contests. The rule works particularly well in granting retail
investors — who lack other avenues to meaningfully engage with management — a voice
in the companies they own.” INVESTOR RIGHTS FORUM https://www.investorrightsforum.co
m [https://perma.cc/QF6H-5JU3] (last visited Jan. 24, 2021) (quoting Council of Institutional

502

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 23:2

The SEC, however, has now proposed changes to the rule that would limit
this important mechanism that investors can use to express those concerns.170
In the words of one advocacy group, that
would make it more difficult for shareholders to vote
independently of management . . . by rigging the rules to make it
more difficult to file shareholder proposals or issue proxy advice
on a wide array of issues from excessive executive pay to climate
risk or board and staff diversity.171
Among other changes, the SEC would step up the ownership amount
required to submit a proposal to $25,000 if the stock has only been held for
one year and only retain the $2,000 amount if the shares have been owned
for three years.172 This would make it more difficult for groups with limited
resources to meet the threshold required to submit proposals. One such
prominent organization that would be adversely affected by the SEC’s action
is the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR).
During the half-century of its existence, the ICCR, a coalition of over
300 religious and other socially minded investors, has sought dialogue with
corporate leaders on a wide range of concerns involving social and
environmental issues. When those are unproductive, ICCR members have
used the proxy proposal system to make their voices heard. They submitted
over 300 of those resolutions in 2017.173
D. Comments of a Member of Wells Fargo’s Panel
Sister Nora Nash of the Franciscan Sisters of Philadelphia is part of the
ICCR leadership and also sits on Wells Fargo’s new Stakeholders’ Advisory
Council. In a conversation, she described her fellow members of the bank’s
panel as “seven folks from different backgrounds urging the company to
Investors CEO, Ken Bertsch).
170. This is in line with an approach that one commentator has described with these
remarks: “Today the Republican Party has become so radicalized that it opposes almost any
government action to solve problems. Its domestic agenda consists largely of cutting taxes
for the rich and freeing companies from oversight.” David Leonhardt, The Questions all
Democrats Need to Ask Themselves, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/02/09/opinion/democrats-2020-election.html [https://perma.cc/7MVC-9UCK].
171. Investor Rights Forum, Securities and Exchange Commission Rulemaking Threatens
to Disrupt ESG Investment Ecosystem and Undermine Shareholder Rights https://www.invest
orrightsforum.com/rights-at-risk [https://perma.cc/8AL6-9W7M] (last visited Feb. 15, 2020).
172. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Proposes Amendments to Modernize
Shareholder Proposal Rule, Exchange Act Release 2019-232 (Nov. 5, 2019).
173. Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, Catalyzing Corporate Change, https:/
/www.iccr.org/about-iccr [https://perma.cc/FED4-MGG6] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
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move in the right direction.”174 She saw the purpose of the Council as
bringing an outside view to the company’s problems.
Chief among them, she said, are how it has treated its workforce,
particularly those who were fired for the “horrible things” which went on at
the company during the long-standing and massive frauds that the bank was
perpetrating on its customers. Were those discharged employees the real
culprits, she questioned, or just workers pressured into dishonest practices
by top level officers of the company? Despite the company’s professions of
reform, she indicated that the panel was still looking for answers and
exercising oversight to see if the bank’s new management would show a real
commitment to change as reflected in its corporate culture.
Sister Nash went on to further describe the role of the Council as
examining the important and salient issues facing the bank. Among those
were its human rights policies as evidenced in its lending practices. She said
that Wells Fargo had appropriately stopped funding the private prison
industry but noted that it was still providing lines of credit to the National
Rifle Association and to various fossil fuel companies—some that were
involved in the environmentally harmful practice of fracking and extracting
minerals from tar sands.
The panel saw its role, she said, not only to admonish Wells Fargo’s
management about such unethical activity, but also to apprise them
pragmatically of the harmful and expensive consequences that might arise
from it. Those could include reputational loss as well as financial and
litigation risks.
On the broader issues of societally responsive corporate governance,
she pointed to progress on the human rights front by retailers. Facing public
pressure about exploitive and unsafe working conditions in their supply
chains, they have taken some corrective action. She spoke of the need to still
target unethical recruitment practices that are tantamount to human
trafficking.
Overall, Sister Nash was hopeful that the panel would be effective in
moving Wells Fargo toward more ethical and environmentally sustainable
conduct. She said the bank’s management appeared to be listening to the
panel’s comments and appreciating its feedback on the company’s policies.
V.

CONCLUSION

Given the historical character of American businesses as profit-seeking
174. Phone interview of Sister Nora Nash of the Franciscan Sisters of Philadelphia
(February 14, 2020).
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organizations, it may be a bit much to expect large scale altruistic behavior
from our corporations.175 In the past, various reform movements have
attempted to curb their excessively anti-social behavior through
regulation,176 and the Business Roundtable’s recent statement may be a
laudable attempt to instill some higher-minded aspirations into internal
corporate decision making.177 Yet one could rightly assume that it, like the
regulatory approach, will meet with limited success.
Corporate leaders nevertheless are powerful individuals with much of
our country’s resources at their disposal. True, they must satisfy the
demands that their investors and the market put on them, but as the
Roundtable’s Statement shows, executives are increasingly recognizing the
larger inequities in our society and would like to do something about them.
If corporations are now “soulless”178 creatures, Stakeholder Advisory
Councils may be a way to implant souls in them. If nothing more, those
panels can serve as a bridge from corporations to society at large, sensitizing
those firms to their impact on our common life and prodding them to serve
the larger purposes of our nation.

175. As this article was being prepared for printing, another article was scheduled to
appear in the Cornell Law Review, taking a more critical viewpoint of stakeholder
participation in corporate governance than this piece. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert Tallarita,
The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, CORN. L. REV. (2020) (forthcoming).
The authors there assert that stakeholders are not benefited by these reforms. Rather,
they insulate corporate leaders from accountability to shareholders and impede more
meaningful measures that would better protect stakeholders.
This article expresses some of the same reservations about reforms such as those
proposed by the Business Roundtable’s revised statement on corporate purpose. However,
the author of this piece continues in the belief that Stakeholder Advisory Councils are a good
first step in promoting more responsible corporate governance.
176. See supra notes 56-70 and accompanying text (discussing the early era of progressive
reforms to corporate law).
177. See supra notes 131-137 and accompanying text (discussing the shift from the
shareholder primacy approach to an approach that included stakeholder interests).
178. Coffee, supra note 1 and accompanying text.

